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Abstract 
The East African Community (EAC) is in a quest to integrate further to form a currency union. However, empirical 
evidence has shown that policies initiated as a panacea have failed due to weak institutions. In this background, the 
study seeks to investigate the role of existing institutions on trade using an augmented gravity model of trade. The 
Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) was used due to its efficiency. Also, the study estimates the impact of 
infrastructure on trade. Additionally, the study estimates whether Burundi and Rwanda gained from joining EAC in 
2009 or rather contributed significantly to trade in EAC. The study showed that institutions are not contributing 
significantly to trade. Additionally, the study showed that infrastructure had a positive impact on trade. The study also 
showed that Burundi and Rwanda benefited from joining the EAC by a combined 81%. The study concludes that there 
is a greater potential to trade therefore an exigency for a new institutional framework and reforms to facilitate trade 
by reducing trade and non-trade barriers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The treaty of June 1976 formalized the East Africa Community (EAC) as a customs union comprising Kenya, Uganda, 
and Tanganyika, present-day Tanzania. Under colonial rule, the East African currency board issued a single currency 
by practicing the Sterling Exchange rate regime until countries gained independence and separately established central 
banks due to limited discretion of monetary policy in 1967 ( Masson & Pattillo, 2004). However, the EAC collapsed 
in 1977 due to alleged skewed benefits to Kenya attributed to relatively greater industrialization than the other 
members (Musonda et al, 1997). This led to the signed Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-
operation in November 1993 which was launched in 1996 and paved way for the treaty of 30 th November 1999 to 
cement East African Community (EAC) as the official name and revived on 7 July 2000. To facilitate the firm 
implementation of objectives seven institutions were established. Articles 5, 8 and 13 of the treaty stipulated the 
objectives of the community with greater emphasizes laid on developing policies and programs to widen and deepen 
co-operation in diverse ways and laid the long term plan of the community in attaining a political union by harmonizing 
macroeconomic policies and removal of all barriers to trade. 
The Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Customs union was signed on 2 March 2004 as a 
stepping stone towards achieving the long term perspective of a political union which was commenced on 1 January 
2005. This led to the implementation of a Common External Tariff (CET), elimination of customs duty, scrapped off 
charges of equivalent effect on imports, and set the tone to eliminate all tariffs by 2010. The Customs Union aimed to 
liberalize intra-EAC trade and promote efficiency in production through facilitating the free movement of goods within 
the community. The Republic of Burundi and Rwanda acceded to the EAC treaty on 18 th June 2007 and officially 
joined in 2009. To facilitate the establishment of a currency union by 2012 led to the set out nominal convergence 
criteria to reduce asymmetry of shocks among members. However, countries inability to attain the laid down criteria 
was attributed to infrastructural deficits (Kishore & Ssozi, 2011). Given this, the EAC trade Negotiation Act was 
brought to bear in the year 2008 which was led by a Joint Trade Negotiations Commission. Also, the Common Market 
Protocol was signed in November 2009 and implemented in July 2010, to facilitate the free movements of capital, 
goods, persons, and services (WTO, 2012). The Customs Management Act of 2004 was amended and implemented 
in 2012. 
The Protocol on East African Monetary Union was signed by Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and the Republic 
of Burundi in November 2013, igniting the desire to establish a currency union by 2024. It spilled out the processes 
including macroeconomic convergence criteria, legal and institutional framework for the establishment by 2024 of a 
single currency. In this background, the pinpointed coverage on harmonization of policies include fiscal policy 
coordination and harmonization, monetary and exchange rate policy harmonization, statistic harmonization, banking 
supervision, and financial stability, harmonization of payments financial market coordination,  and settlement systems, 
and cohesive accounting and financial standards. EAC also decided to establish the East African Monetary Institute 
and the East African Central Bank to fulfill these goals. Also, the Competition Act was implemented after its 
amendment in 2009 and the Trade Negotiation Bill was drafted in 2014. Also, the East African Payments System 
(EAPS) was launched to allow members to transact using all sovereign currencies in March 2014 even though the 
prevalence of some transaction costs. The Protocol on the Monetary Union was ratified by all five partner states in 
early 2015. As a result of the efforts, South Sudan filed to join the community in March 2016 and became a member 
in April 2016. The EAC Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act was implemented in 2017. All members of EAC are 
eligible members of the World Trade Organization except for South Sudan. Additionally, the community has an 
international Free Trade Area (FTA) Agreements notably Europe and the United States. Also, the EAC is an eligible 
beneficiary of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement, touted as the World largest Free Trade 
Area, aimed to create a common market for goods, resources, and services to facilitate investment, healthy 
competitiveness and resolve overlapping memberships to promote socio-economic stability under Article 3 of the 
treaty outlined to begin on 1 July 2020.  
 
Despite the rattling effort of EAC, the level of trade remained robust, below 23 % of total trade (UNCTAD database, 
2018). The East African Community (EAC) is plagued with trade and non-trade barriers leading to the low level of 
trade in the community (AfDB, 2018). The non-trade barriers consist of smuggling, bribery and corruption, inadequate 
trade and transport infrastructure, illegal trade practices, political interferences and wrangling, fake documentations, 
political instability, human trafficking, high illiteracy among small-scale business operators who uses informal 
channels to export their goods due to the ignorance of the policy on free movement of goods,  poor business services 
such as banking, auditing, and insurance, embezzlement of national coffers, security-related issues, wrong invoicing, 
human rights violation among others. (Alusala, 2010; Balisttreri et al., 2014; United Nations Office of Drugs and 
Crimes, 2016; East Africa Bribery Index, 2017 by Transparency International; Kaminchia, 2019, AfDB, 2019).  
These non-trade barriers increase the cost of trading and culminate in the large informal sector. Other significant 
barriers to trade in EAC are nontariff, tariffs, import restrictions, and export restrictions utilizing bans and quotas 
(Okumu, 2010; Mkuna, 2014; World Bank, 2014; ODI, 2016, 2017, AfDB, 2019). Currency union has proven to be a 
panacea for these ills in other regions. As a result, the exigency for countries to integrate further to form a currency 
union in 2024 has been touted.  
Rodrik (2009) showed that virtually every major development strategy of the past five decades has fallen short of 
becoming a panacea.  Additionally, Easterly (2001) showed the failed policy-oriented panacea that has failed which 
includes conditional aid, debt forgiveness, foreign aid, education, family planning, big infrastructure projects, foreign 
investment, and so on. In his argument, none of these activities will have any impact on development unless countries 
meet the basic institutional requirements: rule of law, corruption-free government, and protection of property rights, 
efficient bureaucracy, and political constraint on the Executive. In this background, the current paradigm influencing 
recent reforms emphasizes the importance of improved institutions as one of the key factors enhancing trade hence 
economic growth. In this context, formal institutions have proven to reduce uncertainty which creates transaction 
costs, especially currency risk and insecurity of international exchange, thereby reduces the cost of doing business. In 
this context, institutions have proven to facilitate trade and ensure transparency (Peng, 2009; Iwanow, 2012; Beyer & 
Fening, 2012; Ogundipe et al., 2014; Krenz, 2016; Yushi & Bogoro, 2018; Álvarez et al, 2018). Additionally, 
Government-enforced trade barriers, such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers, also contribute to trade transaction costs 
(Baeten and den Butter, 2006). Hypothetically, Shirley (2005) showed that “societies with persistently higher 
transaction costs have less trade, fewer firms, less specialization, less investment, and lower productivity. Institutions 
determine whether transaction costs are low or high. As a result, institutions can help attenuate the adverse effect of 
trade and non-trade barriers. This has necessitated the need to investigate the impact of institutions on trade in EAC. 
Additionally, the study estimates the impact of infrastructure on trade in EAC. Finally, the study estimates the impact 
of Rwanda and Burundi membership on trade in EAC. There exist studies focusing on some aspects of institutions on 
the various trade-related activities (Welsh, 2007; Lilaya, 2011; Muluvi et al.,2012, Karau & Mburu  2014, Ufford & 
Zaal, 2014; Ghosh & Uddhammar, 2015;  Sutton et al., 2015; Njeru, 2019 among others). However, there is no study 
on the aggregate impact of institutions on trade in the community. In this background, the aggregate effect will show 
the need for improvement in such institutions. The study estimates the role of institutions on trade for policy 
implication purposes due to limited studies. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Theory on Institutions  
According to North (1990), ‘Institutions are the formal and informal rules and norms that organize economic, political, 
and social relations’. Additionally, institutions are brought to life by people and organizations (North, 1990; Leftwich 
& Sen, 2010), it provides a relatively predictable structure for everyday social, economic and political life, and shape 
people’s incentives and behaviours. According to Leftwich & Sen (2009; 2010), institutions shape but do not 
necessarily always determine behaviour. The traditional approach used to explain the effect of institutions on trade is 
underpinned in the transaction costs theory propounded by Roland Coase. In the study, Coase (1992) pointed out that 
the effects of high transaction costs are “pervasive in the economy” and that “if the costs of making an exchange are 
greater than the gains which that exchange would bring, that exchange would not take place. The theory postulates 
that institutions affect trade volumes through their impact on transaction costs. In this context, the authors showed that 
weak institutions raise international transaction costs and hamper international trade. They argue that “trade is reduced 
by hidden transaction costs associated with the insecurity of international exchange: contracts may not be enforceable 
across jurisdictional boundaries, bribes may be extorted by customs officials, and shipments may even be hijacked.”  
On the other hand, the authors find that “trade expands dramatically when it is supported by strong institutions – 
specifically, by a legal system capable of enforcing commercial contracts and by transparent and impartial formulation 
and implementation of government economic policy” (Anderson & Marcouiller, 1999). Development practitioners 
have tended to prioritize formal institutions, viewing informal ones as separate and often detrimental to development 
outcomes (Unsworth, 2010). Empirically, economic institutions shape the rights, regulatory framework, and degree 
of rent-seeking and corruption, inland, housing, labour and credit markets (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Leftwich & 
Sen, 2010: 17; World Bank, 2013a: 8). Many cross-country statistical studies find that more inclusive economic 
institutions improve economic outcomes (Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). Moreover, democratic 
political institutions tend to have growth-enhancing and growth-stabilizing effects, (Evans & Ferguson, 2013: 35, 51). 
Therefore, an exigency for institutions to ensure transparency and growth of the sub-region in line with the policy of 
a common currency. More recent theoretical and empirical research highlighted that institutions can also impact on 
trade via the production effect (Beck, 2002; Nunn, 2004; Claessens & Laeven, 2004; and Cuñat & Melitz, 2003). The 
production cost effect approach highlights the fact that institutions can alter production costs. This literature identifies 
how specific sub-components of the institutional environment, such as contract enforcement mechanisms, property 
rights, labour market regulations, and structure of the financial sector, affect countries’ comparative advantage. The 
quality of institutions is central as it permits to overcome frictions that occur when two parties with different and often 
opposing interests enter into a productive relationship. Yet the literature has thus far not made a unified attempt at 
empirically testing the impact of institutions on comparative advantage patterns. The production cost effect approach 
highlights the fact that institutions can alter production costs. Another important notion highlighted by the literature 
on contract enforcement and its impact on trade is that firms might adapt their organizational structures to cope with 
imperfect enforcement of contracts (Antras & Helpman, 2008). In particular, firms often respond to poor contract 
enforcement by vertically integrating their production processes. According to Nunn (2007), countries with good 
contract enforcement specialize in the production (and export) of goods for which relationship-specific investments 
are most important. The author also found that differences in contract enforcement abilities of nations affect the global 
trade pattern to a greater extent than differences in physical and human capital. Furthermore, the institutional model 
adopted to enhance trade fails to capture key trade components in the sub-region which has a greater cost to the level 
and quality of trade due to peculiarity in problems facing the sub-region. Also, Williamson (1971, 1979) who pointed 
out that vertical integration can be a firm’s response to the hold-up problem. Williamson emphasized that moving the 
production of specific inputs inside the firm's boundaries reduces dependence on contract enforcement for the final 
good. The key assumption is that the impact of contract enforcement regulations on the comparative advantage of 
complex goods is reduced when firms are better able to integrate vertically. Given that production processes vary 
between industries, different sectors will have different inherent capacities for vertical integration. This implies that 
the institutional environment can have an impact on organizational structure, which in turn affects the structure of 
economic exchanges, productivity, and other factors. Kaufmann & Wei (1999) tested the ‘efficient grease’ hypothesis 
which stipulates that firms may find bribes helpful to minimize the effective red tape it faces. However, they find that 
corruption does not improve exchanges, instead, if corruption is widespread, time spent with bureaucrats and the 
regulatory burden is high. Additionally, Winters (2004) highlighted that “the less restrictive is trade policy, the lower 
are the incentives for corruption while simpler more transparent and non-discretionary policies reduce the scope for 
corruption.” Empirically, Ades & Di Tella (1999) argued that there is a correlation between economic rents resulting 
from trade restrictions, active industrial policy measures, and higher corruption rates. Corruption, as demonstrated by 
Mauro (1995), lowers investment and economic growth. Moreover, Wei (2000) examines another potential reason for 
the relationship between corruption and trade openness: “open countries face greater losses from corruption than less 
open ones because corruption impinges disproportionately on foreign transactions. As a result, they have greater 
incentives to develop better institutions.” Wei (2000) supports this hypothesis through a cross-country panel analysis. 
The author shows that corruption is associated with what he terms “natural openness” (the share of trade that can be 
attributed to clear exogenous variables such as distance, population, and land area), but not with “residual openness.” 
The latter term Wei defines as the difference between actual and natural openness which can be related to the economic 
policies implemented by a country.   
Chor (2010) analyses different sub-components of institutional quality and develops a model that measures the effects 
of factor endowments, Ricardian productivity, and institutions. The results confirm the role of factor endowments and 
various types of institutions as a source of comparative advantage. Chor provides theoretical foundations to the notion 
that institutions might impact on trade by affecting countries’ comparative advantage. Levchenko (2004), whose 
model of international trade examines differences in institutional quality based on an incomplete contract as the source 
of comparative advantage. In his study, the model indicates that poor countries with weak institutions may fail to 
benefit from trade, as trade pushes factor prices to diverge. Nunn (2007) also examines the effect of contracting 
institutions on trade but his initial assumptions somewhat differ from Levchenko. The author finds that countries with 
good contracting institutions tend to specialize in exports for which relation-specific investments are most important. 
His estimates show that the quality of contract enforcement explains a larger share of global trade patterns than 
counties’ factor endowments. Analysis by Costinot (2009) proposes a theoretical model seeking to explain how 
contract enforcement institutions affect comparative advantage. Under free trade, the country where teams are larger 
– in efficiency units of labour – specializes in the more complex goods. In our set-up, it is the country where the 
product of institutional quality and workers' human capital is larger. Hence, better institutions and higher levels of 
education are complementary sources of comparative advantage in the more complex industries. Government-
enforced trade barriers, such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers, also contribute to trade transaction costs (Baeten & den 
Butter, 2006). The argument of Shirley (2005) highlighted that, in environments where obtaining information on the 
forthcoming transaction is expensive and where private property is less than perfectly protected, contracts are more 
difficult to specify and enforce for all possible eventualities. As a result, transaction costs increase, with negative 
consequences for productive activity. Shirley (2005) notes that “societies with persistently higher transaction costs 
have less trade, fewer firms, less specialization, less investment, and lower productivity. Institutions determine 
whether transaction costs are low or high.Ranjan & Lee (2007) undertake an empirical analysis of the impact of 
contract enforcement on trade, demonstrating that trade volumes are more affected by contract enforcement quality in 
sectors that are more institutionally-intensive. The authors find a positive correlation between the quality of contract 
enforcement and the volume of international trade, with this impact becoming more pronounced for more 
differentiated goods. Moreover, Berkowitz et al. (2006) assess how the quality of national institutions, in particular 
those related to complex products whose distinctive features are hard to fully specify in a contract, affect international 
exchange. The authors show that well-designed institutions in an exporting country increase international trade. 
Institutions in both the importing and the exporting countries are assumed to influence transaction costs in simple and 
complex products. But “while international transaction costs affect the costs of trade, domestic transaction costs affect 
complex and simple products differently, thereby changing comparative advantage. McLaren (2000) examines how 
trade openness influences the organization of production in an industry equilibrium. The author argues that opening 
to trade has the effect of “thickening” the market, giving each firm a greater selection of procurement options from 
“downstream” suppliers. Also, Antràs & Helpman (2004) proceed from similar assumptions regarding firms’ choices 
on final good production. They show that when trade costs decline, final-good producers tend to rely more on foreign 
outsourcing than on the creation of multinational firms. 
 The theoretical model by Grossman & Helpman (2002) analyses the choice between integration and outsourcing, in 
closed and open economy frameworks. They find that international outsourcing depends on the thickness of the market 
for input suppliers, institutions of contract enforcement in a country, and the costs of information regarding foreign 
and domestic markets. Extending Grossman and Helpman’s analysis, Antras (2003) creates a two-country, two-good 
(final and intermediate) model. In the model, final-good producers decide whether to share investment costs of 
intermediate input production with their suppliers. Investment-sharing is assumed to decrease the severity of the hold-
up problem but becomes more difficult in labour-intensive sectors. Under these assumptions, vertical integration 
becomes more likely as the intermediate input becomes more capital-intensive. The theoretical and empirical literature 
shows that institutions affect the level of trade in diverse ways and key in stimulating growth. Ogundipe et al. (2014) 
examined whether institutions matter when engaging in international trade using data span from 1980 to 2010. The 
methodology used in the study was the General Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. The result showed that 
indigenous institutions deployed protectionist measures by increasing tariffs on imported goods whereas international 
institutions reduce regional tariffs. In conclusion, the study showed that institutions matter in reducing transaction cost 
notably when engaging in international trade. Álvarez et al. (2018) assessed the importance of institutions in 
stimulating trade of 186 countries using data span from 1996 to 2012. The methodology used was the gravity model 
of international trade based on sectorial trade framework estimated with the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood 
test. The result showed that both the institutional conditions at the destination and the institutional distance between 
exporting and importing countries are relevant factors for bilateral trade.  The study concludes that institutions quality 
influences international trade. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Dataset 
The study used a dataset with 360 bilateral trade observations spanning from 2000 to 2017 (some observations are 
missing for the dependent variable). Export data was sourced from United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), and International Monetary Fund Direction of Trades (DOTs). GDP, FDI, and GDP per 
capita were sourced from World’s Bank World Development Indicators (WDI), the distance was sourced from CEPII, 
Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and 
WDI, data on Tariff was obtained from World Bank’s ESCAP and Institutional quality data was obtained from World 
Governance Indicators, trade and transport infrastructure was sourced from World Bank Logistics Performance Index.  
The study used an augmented gravity model of international trade in the estimation of the trade costs effect on trade 
in line with examining the works of Ogundipe et al. (2014), Anukoonwattaka (2016), Abasimi (2018), Abdul-Wahab 
(2018), and Norley &Rosenthal (2019) among others. 
Model 1 
Xij = β0 +β1ln(YiYj/PopiPopj)t +β2Vij + β3lnCrptctrlij +β4lnPSij+β5lnGEij +β6lnRQij + β7lnRLij+β8lnVAij+πlnTariffij+ 
φlnFDIij 
+εijt…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………… 3.1 
Model 2 
Xij=β0+β1ln(YiYj)+𝛽2(YiYj/PopiPopj)t+β3lnDij+β4lnContij+β5lnLangij+β6Langij+β7Comcolij+φlnFDIij+β8Vij+ β9lnPSij 
+ 𝛽10lnqtyTinfij+ πlnTariffij +εijt………………………………………………………………………..…………………….……………………………… 3.2 
Model 3 
Xij=β0+β1ln(YiYj)+𝛽2(YiYj/PopiPopj)t+β3lnDij+β4lnContij+β5lnLangij+β6Comcolij+β7lnFDIij+β8Vij+𝜎Peakness 
+β9lnPSij + β10lnRLij +𝛽11lnqtyTinfij+ 𝛽12nTariffij +𝛽13lnNontariffij+𝜗EAC + εijt………..………….……………………...…..3.3 
 
Where i and j denotes countries, t denotes time, and the variables are defined as: Xij denotes the value of bilateral trade 
(exports) between i and j, Y is real GDP, Pop is population, Vt(ij) is the volatility of the bilateral (between i and j) real 
effective exchange rate in the period before t, Peaknessij  is a binary variable that is unitary if the exchange rate is low 
peaked and 0 otherwise in the period t, RLij denotes the product of rule of law in the country-pairs, VAij denotes the 
product of voice and accountability between country-pairs, Crptctrlij represent corruption control effort in the country-
pairs, PSij represent the product of political stability and absence of voice between country-pairs, GEij represent the 
product of Government effectiveness between country-pairs, RQij represent the product of regulatory quality of 
country-pairs, lnqtyTinfij  is the product of the quality of trade and transport infrastructure on trade between country-
pairs, Tariffij represent the charge between country-pairs, FDIij represent foreign direct inflow between the country-
pairs, Dij is the distance between i and j , Nontariffij  represent the reported non-trade barriers between country-pairs, 
EAC is a binary that is unitary when Burundi and Rwanda were members and 0 otherwise during the trading period, 
ij  is a vector of nuisance coefficients, and represents the myriad other influences on bilateral exports, assumed to be 
well behaved, (Where I = 1, 2,.……N is the number of countries where N=5, t is the time-series dimension of the data 
(t=18 years). However, South Sudan was not used in the estimation due to limited data on the various variables of 
interests. 
Definition of Variables and Expected Signs 
Export was adopted in the model to represent trade flows between countries at the levels since imports is usually 
underestimated. GDP was used to proxy for the economic mass of the country in the model. It was measured as the 
log product of the GDP of country-pairs. GDP per capita was used as a proxy for access to the market. It was measured 
as the log product of GDP per capita of the country-pairs in the model. Distance is the transportation cost involved in 
trading between the two countries. The coefficient of sharing a land border is expected to have a positive relationship 
with trade. Spatial theory of trade depicts that countries sharing border tends to cooperate to enhance trade. The 
coefficient of Language is expected to have a positive relationship with trade. Adam Smith argued in ‘Wealth of 
Nations’ that common language enhances trade and exchange utilizing effectively communicating the task in hand to 
the trading partners and easily convincing parties to know it is in their best interest. The coefficient of a common 
currency is expected to have a positive effect on trade. Exchange rate volatility was computed as the standard deviation 
of the moving average of the natural log of real effective exchange rate (REER). The study used real effective exchange 
rate data in the computation of the exchange rate volatility using the standard deviation approach due to the latest 
development in exchange rate volatility measures (Serenis & Tsounis, 2014). Recent development in trade stipulates 
countries are no more interested in the value of their currency with another country but rather how its currency is 
valuated with their major trading partners. Real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective exchange rate (a 
measure of the value of several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator or index of costs. According to Serenis 
(2012), the main criticism of using standard deviation as a measure for exchange rate volatility fails to capture the 
potential effects of high and low peak values of the exchange rate.  
The high and low peak values refer to the unpredictable factor which affects trade. The peak of exchange rate volatility 
was computed as the average of the volatility, deducted from the various values and represented by 1 if low peaked 
and 0 otherwise (PEAKNESS).  
Tariff is defined as the taxes charged on goods and services imported. According to the World Bank ESCAP, Tariff 
answers the question, ‘Evaluate the effect of tariffs on agricultural goods. The study used six indicators of institutional 
quality namely; rule of law, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and government effectiveness. Rule of Law 
captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. Moreover, Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.  Also, the control of 
corruption was captured as the perception of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as the capture of the state by elites and private interests. Furthermore, 
Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality are 
related to the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and initiate sound policies, which is quite similar to 
business regulations, measured by the Doing Business indicators. Voice and Accountability as defined by WGI, Voice 
and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens can participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Finally, Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-
motivated violence, including terrorism. The coefficient is expected to have a positive impact on trade. The various 
indicators of institutions were measured as the log product of the country-pairs.  
 
Estimation technique and Empirical Application 
Monte Carlo simulation shows that the gravity model of international trade is best estimated using a nonlinear model 
(Silva Santos and Tenreyro, 2011).  The Poisson Pseudo Maximum likelihood is the best estimator for the gravity 
model due to the prevalence of zero trade-in data and its prowess of eliminating heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, 
catering for model misspecification among others. Furthermore, the PPML estimates is efficient in both small and 
large sample size (Silva Santos and Tenreyro, 2006). To buttress. The PPML is the best estimator for estimating the 
coefficients of the gravity model (Bobková, 2012; Martin & Pham, 2015; Vavrek, 2018).  
4.1: Results for the impact of institutions on trade 
The study estimates the effect of institutions on trade  
Table 1 Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) Estimates 
Variables Coefficients 
GDP per capita 3.471*** 
(.5204883) 
Volatility -.267 
(.6403932) 
Corruption Control -.063 
 (.2793309) 
Government Effectiveness 1.115 
 (.6891704) 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence .659 
(.4491196) 
Regulatory Quality -.411 
 (.291757) 
Rule of Law -.300 
 (.3294651) 
Voice and Accountability -.765*** 
(.1892399) 
Tariffs -3.502*** 
(.9357429) 
FDI -.034 
(.0929558) 
_cons 6.205 
 (4.333609) 
Note: *, ** and *** represent rejection of null hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
                                                                                                                                Robust Standard Errors are in the parenthesis.  Author’s Estimates
 
Corruption Control is found to have a negative but insignificant effect on trade with an estimated coefficient of -.063. 
The result is startling because efforts channeled to attenuate the adverse effect of corruption have not materialized. 
The evidence shows that there are greater loopholes in the community compared to the efforts channeled towards 
attenuating corruption. According to Transparency International’s East Africa Bribery index (2017), corruption and 
bribery are highly prevalent despite the efforts to reform public institutions and educate citizens on the consequences 
of corruption which partly attributed to lack of strict and rigorous measures to punish culprits. Government 
Effectiveness is found to have a positive but insignificant effect on trade with an estimated coefficient of 1.115. The 
result is not startling because some fragments of the public services were found to hamper trade. In the East Africa 
Bribery index, 2017 survey on public services, the police in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda, the judiciary of Uganda 
and the police in Rwanda were rated the top five most bribery-prone institutions in EAC. Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence is found to have a positive but insignificant effect on trade with an estimated coefficient of .659. 
The result is not startling because the goal of attaining a stable and politically unified EAC has been effective 
(Cichecka, 2018). Regulatory Quality is found to have a negative but insignificant effect on trade with an estimated 
coefficient of -.411. The result is not startling because policies formulated were hindered by time-elapse hitherto some 
policies yet to be implemented notably the Single Customs Territory, failed monetary union in 2012, People-Centered 
Community among others. Rule of law is found to have a negative but insignificant effect on trade with an estimated 
effect of -.300. The result is not startling because there have been declines in the long-lasting autocratic nature of 
governance in East African Community according to Freedom House’s Freedom to the World 2015 report notably in 
Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda. Contrarily, Kenya enacting a new constitution and several reforms are now practicing 
some level of autocracy. (Freedom House, 2015). Voice and Accountability is found to have a negative and significant 
n trade. The estimated coefficient of Voice and Accountability is -.765 and significant at 1%. The result is not startling 
because the East African Court of Justice has not designed a well-demarcated line on what seems to be a human rights 
abuse under article 27(2) of the East African Community Treaty (Possi, 2015). Also, there are restrictions to press 
freedom with the media operations highly under political swing which led to the dissemination of false information 
notably the 2017 general election of Kenya, which caused a conundrum between the people and the media. This 
effected freedom of expression. Also, Tanzania reduced press freedom through legislative means by imposing three 
laws notably the 2015 statistical act, the 2015 Cybercrime Act, and the 2016 Media Services Act (Freedom House, 
2018). Also, Uganda imposed repressive new laws aimed at political opposition, independent media, women, civil 
society among others. In Burundi, the breach of the constitutional term of office by the President to run an additional 
term and initiated measures to frustrate the opposition. Rwanda continuously implement repressive measures in the 
view of ensuring national security (Freedom House, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2: Results for trade and transport infrastructure on trade  
The study estimates the effect of trade and transport infrastructure on trade  
Table 2 Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) Estimates 
Variables Coefficients 
GDP .694 
 (.503237) 
GDP per capita .807 
 (1.207993) 
Distance -.283 
(.9583379) 
Border .502 
 (.3012646) 
Language -.137   
 (.6723092) 
Colonizer -.161 
(.1861638) 
FDI .152  
 (.1351261) 
Volatility -.284 
(.3815617) 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence .0129 
 (.3126687) 
infrastructure .875*** 
(.3385064) 
Tariff -4.269*** 
(.972469) 
_cons 9.209 
(8.175903) 
Note: *, ** and *** represent rejection of null hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
                                                                                                                                Robust Standard Errors are in the parenthesis.  
Infrastructure is found to have a positive effect on trade and significant at 1% with an estimated coefficient of 0.875. 
The result shows that the existing infrastructure support trade. The result is not startling because of the implementation 
of the EAC interstate road transport policy which reduced documentation for crews and vehicles at border crossings 
and harmonized immigration regulations. The effort has made transportation easier and encourage cross-country trade 
relations in line with developments in education and labour market among members of EAC (Cichecka, 2018). The 
proposed hard infrastructure such as rerouting of the regional infrastructure, railways among others in EAC has not 
been encouraging. 
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4.2: Results for the impact of Burundi and Rwanda membership on trade  
The study estimates the impact of Burundi and Rwanda membership of EAC on trade  
Table 2 Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) Estimates 
Variables Coefficients 
GDP 1.455 ** 
(.5868404) 
GDP per capita -.648  
(.9711305) 
Distance .717 
 (.8740689) 
Border .743** 
  (.2905976) 
Language -.620 
 (.8003494) 
Colonizer -.493 ** 
(.2164802) 
Volatility -.284  
 (.4314461) 
Peakness .099 
 (.1264159) 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence .235 
 (.338119) 
Rule of Law -.653 
(.5332479) 
Tariff -6.955*** 
(1.101569) 
FDI .277 
(.1821148) 
Nontariff 2.169** 
(1.050994) 
Infrastructure .751** 
(.3801787) 
EAC -.814* 
(.4351147) 
_cons 1.192 
(9.423201) 
Note: *, ** and *** represent rejection of null hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
                                                                                                                                Robust Standard Errors are in the parenthesis.  
The coefficient of EAC is found to be negative and significant on trade with an estimated coefficient of -.814 at 10%. 
The result shows that EAC membership reduced trade costs hence Burundi and Rwanda benefited from joining the 
East African Community rather than contributed to trade in the community by 81%. In this context, the result reinstates 
regional integration enhances trade by reducing barriers. This is not startling because the main contributors to the 
community have been Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda due to the economic size and lasting trade ties even though 
challenged with impediments to trade.  
 
 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results show that institutions are not facilitating trade hitherto voice and accountability the most 
prevalent in reducing the volume of trade due to the inability of the citizens to express and effectively exercise their 
views. Also, the study showed that trade and transport infrastructure had a positive and significant effect on trade. 
Furthermore, the study showed that Burundi and Rwanda benefited from joining EAC rather than contributing to trade 
within the community.  
The study recommends that protocols of EAC should devise an institutional framework to reduce transaction costs. In 
this background, improvement in institutions will unearth greater trade potential as well as the large informal sector. 
Regulatory Quality was found to have a negative but insignificant effect on trade. In this background, every country 
has a different regulatory framework deployed to curtail irregularities in the system.  
Author’s Estimates
 
As a result, countries experience spillovers of poor regulatory framework form other members, therefore the need for 
a complementary regulatory framework to stimulate relatively equal private sector involvement in trade. An institution 
has to be established to coordinates policies in line with undertaking cost and benefits analysis on the various 
regulatory options to tackle the most relevant challenges, to improve upon the existing regulatory framework design 
to obtain relatively accurate information. Also, the regulatory framework that does not serve the populace interest 
should be removed such as quotas among others. The government is to improve credit ratings by improving regulatory 
accounting practices, initiate policies to stimulate entrepreneurship to affect economic growth and meeting clean 
energy targets by fiscal incentives, public financing mechanisms and complementary regulatory framework or to meet 
the energy targets of the community since it is the fourth largest cost to doing business in developing countries. (World 
Bank doing business Report, 2018). Also, greater accessibility to the donor information with regards to the financiers 
of government regulatory initiatives will ensure greater transparency to stimulate growth. Finally, the community must 
adopt a regulatory framework in the jurisdiction of its economic, political, legal, and constitutional system to ensure 
transparent rules, strong enforcement mechanisms and effective checks and balances to improve the business 
environment for the private sector.  
Corruption Control was estimated to have a negative but insignificant effect on trade. In this background, combating 
corruption cannot be evaluated in the context of the institution alone. Thus, it is an interconnected economic, political, 
and institutional factors therefore dependent on the government in power. Greater transparency, merit-based human 
resource management, and accountability in public administration will attenuate corruption. Also, an improved and 
standardized wages in line with rigorous and strict punishment for culprits can help attenuate corruption. Investment 
in infrastructure to accommodate the relatively high demand for public services such as employment, school 
placements among others. To ensure greater job security, the government is to initiate policies to stimulate greater 
private sector involvement through tax reliefs, provide technical supports for small-scale industries and introduce 
numerous courses in the tertiary institutions to address the needs of the community. The reason for the initiative is to 
reduce the focus on public sector-oriented careers. Also, Policing of codes and conducts of the private sector and 
complying with high governance standards through programmes to build the capacity of institutions. Finally, rigorous 
education on the rights, privileges, and responsibilities as citizens should be well spelled out and communicated 
through mass media to encourage involvement in political decisions. The media and civil society can help denounce 
corruption scandals and mounts pressure on the government to reduce the pernicious effects of corruption. 
Voice and Accountability was estimated to have a negative and significant effect on trade. In this background, the 
study recommends the following solutions to achieve a government for the people. Firstly, press freedom is key to the 
realization notably serving as the mouthpiece of the populace. Greater transparency to ensure information is available 
and communicated to the populace. Also, providing logistics for civil servants and the media to aid citizens monitor 
services and the governments through regular dialogues with government officials. Interconnected governance would 
ensure accountability by involving the right people and forming alliances among parties actively indulged in ensuring 
transparency and accountability. Finally, the need for increase gender equality in government services delivery 
especially women. 
Rule of Law was estimated to have a negative but insignificant effect on trade. In this context, there is the need to a 
single legal system for East Africa Community since incoherent legal systems enhance State’s fragility. This can be 
done by initiating policies of equality, active involvement of local institutions by complementary government 
regulatory agencies and courts, training of officials to run state institutions, and inducing foreign donor participation 
through the EAC community policy framework. In the nutshell, the implementation of these policies will have an 
overall economic improvement on the institutional impact on trade. 
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       _cons     6.204786   4.333609     1.43   0.152    -2.288932     14.6985
         fdi    -.0337586   .0929558    -0.36   0.716    -.2159486    .1484313
      Tariff     -3.50208   .9357429    -3.74   0.000    -5.336102   -1.668057
          VA    -.7652776   .1892399    -4.04   0.000    -1.136181   -.3943743
          RL    -.3004128   .3294651    -0.91   0.362    -.9461524    .3453269
          RQ    -.4106578    .291757    -1.41   0.159    -.9824911    .1611755
          PS     .6593338   .4491196     1.47   0.142    -.2209244    1.539592
          GE      1.11544   .6891704     1.62   0.106     -.235309    2.466189
          CC    -.0625839   .2793309    -0.22   0.823    -.6100625    .4848947
  volatility    -.2668123   .2450774    -1.09   0.276    -.7471552    .2135307
   Percapita     3.470978   .5204883     6.67   0.000      2.45084    4.491116
                                                                              
       trade        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 20 clusters in pairings)
R-squared: .73013922
Pseudo log-likelihood: -2.850e+09
Number of observations dropped: 0
Number of observations: 177
Number of parameters: 11
  
 
                                                                                
         _cons     9.209068   8.175903     1.13   0.260    -6.815407    25.23354
        Tariff      -4.2693    .972469    -4.39   0.000    -6.175304   -2.363296
infrastructure     .8752637   .3385064     2.59   0.010     .2118033    1.538724
            PS     .0129233   .3126687     0.04   0.967    -.5998961    .6257427
    volatility    -.2838758   .3815617    -0.74   0.457    -1.031723    .4639713
           fdi     .1520723   .1351261     1.13   0.260    -.1127699    .4169146
     colonizer    -.1611592   .1861638    -0.87   0.387    -.5260335    .2037152
      language    -.1373719   .6723092    -0.20   0.838    -1.455074     1.18033
        border     .5023445   .3012646     1.67   0.095    -.0881233    1.092812
      distance    -.2834936   .9583379    -0.30   0.767    -2.161801    1.594814
     Percapita     .8066686   1.207993     0.67   0.504    -1.560953    3.174291
           GDP     .6944798    .503237     1.38   0.168    -.2918466    1.680806
                                                                                
         trade        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               Robust
                                                                                
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 20 clusters in pairings)
R-squared: .84816567
Pseudo log-likelihood: -7.529e+08
Number of observations dropped: 0
Number of observations: 58
Number of parameters: 12
                                                                                
         _cons     1.191737   9.423201     0.13   0.899     -17.2774    19.66087
           EAC    -.8137308   .4351147    -1.87   0.061     -1.66654    .0390783
infrastructure     .7509549   .3801787     1.98   0.048     .0058183    1.496092
     nontariff     2.169045   1.050994     2.06   0.039     .1091356    4.228955
           fdi     .2765531   .1821148     1.52   0.129    -.0803854    .6334915
        Tariff    -6.955321   1.101569    -6.31   0.000    -9.114357   -4.796284
            RL    -.6528572   .5332479    -1.22   0.221    -1.698004    .3922895
            PS     .2350036    .338119     0.70   0.487    -.4276974    .8977047
      peakness     .0990079   .1264159     0.78   0.434    -.1487628    .3467785
    volatility    -.2835355   .4314461    -0.66   0.511    -1.129154    .5620833
     colonizer    -.4930835   .2164802    -2.28   0.023    -.9173768   -.0687902
      language    -.6200564   .8003494    -0.77   0.438    -2.188712    .9485996
        border     .7432598   .2905976     2.56   0.011     .1736989    1.312821
      distance     .7166505   .8740689     0.82   0.412     -.996493    2.429794
     Percapita    -.6480475   .9711305    -0.67   0.505    -2.551428    1.255333
           GDP     1.454926   .5868404     2.48   0.013     .3047401    2.605112
                                                                                
         trade        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               Robust
                                                                                
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 19 clusters in pairings)
R-squared: .85716583
Pseudo log-likelihood: -6.034e+08
Number of observations dropped: 0
Number of observations: 53
Number of parameters: 16
